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Résumé: Nous étudions une classe de jeu à la Hotelling. Deux firmes choisissent une localisation et un 
prix dans l'espace des caractéristiques optimales des consommateurs. Un leader choisit 
d'abord ses deux variables, le suiveur observe ces choix avant de jouer. Nous montrons que 
dans une telle situation, tout équilibre a la propriété que le suiveur fait un profit supérieur à 
celui du leader. Un équilibre existe toujours pour des coûts linéaires and nous caractérisons 
les équilibres en fonction de la propension à payer des consommateurs pour la famille de 
produit. Quelques extension sont entreprises, en particulier sur les barrières à l'entrée. 
 
Abstract: We study a class of differentiation games à la Hotelling. Two firms choose a price and a 
location in the consumers' space. The leader first chooses both variables, and the follower 
observes them before playing. It is shown that in such games, any equilibrium has the 
property that the follower always gets a greater profit (in the absence of entry barrier). An 
equilibrium is shown to always exist with linear costs and we qualify the equilibria with 
respect to the willingness to pay for the family of products. Some extensions are looked at. In 
particular, we investigate the effect of entry barriers on the strategies of the leader. 
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1 Introduction
In its pioneering paper ’Stability in competition’, Hotelling (1929) modelled
competition among firms with diﬀerentiated products. He departed from
Cournot’s and Bertrand’s views of perfect substitutes, which implies pure
quantity or pure price competition. Hotelling deals with a linear market
(Main Street) and considers that all consumers, living along the street, buy
one unit of good, choosing the one whose perceived price (mill price plus
transportation costs) is smaller. The two firms compete in price, having
diﬀerent locations, or diﬀerent characteristics in the product space. His main
motivation was to show that competition has not always a ”winner-takes-
all” (namely, the leader in price) form, but that small changes in price only
aﬀects smoothly the quantity sold by a competitor. In equilibrium, when a
firm lowers its price, it does not get the other’s full market share, but only
a fringe of them, varying continuously in price change. From this setting,
another conclusion has be drawn by Hotelling: if firms choose first their
locations, their will be a tendency towards homogeneity of the product: the
firms will tend to choose almost the same location, at the center of the
market. This is the so-called principle of minimum diﬀerenciation.
It is somehow paradoxical that the idea of ’stability’ in competition put
forth by Hotelling is actually invalid in his model, on account of indetermi-
nacy of a stable configuration. Indeed, as pointed out by d’Aspremont & al.
(1979), an equilibrium does not exist for all possible locations of the firms.
If they are too close, a competitive price equilibrium is impossible. Thus
the enunciated Principle of Minimum Diﬀerentiation does not hold even in
Hotelling’s model, because of a non-existence problem. d’Aspremont & al.
continue the discussion with an adaptation of the standard model, chang-
ing the linear transportation costs into quadratic ones. As pointed out by
MacLeod (1985) this implies that the mass of indiﬀerent consumers is zero,
because indiﬀerent consumers are located at a single point. This restores
equilibrium existence, as continuity of payoﬀs is restored. Moreover, in this
setting, the reverse result holds about diﬀerentiation: the firms locate at
the extreme points of the market. Many authors have subsequently found
mitigated results about diﬀerentiation in equilibrium (Economides 1984, Hin-
loopen & van Marrewijk 1999 among others).
While diﬀerentiation models concern a huge literature, we focus in this
paper on the sequentiality of location and price choices. Following Prescott
and Visscher (1977), we use subgame perfection as equilibrium concept. In
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most of the papers, it is assumed that firms choose location first (possibly
sequentially) and once for all, then compete simultaneously in price. Lam-
bertini (2002), for instance, studies sequential entry with discounting. In
his setting, a leader chooses first a location for the whole game. He is first
alone on the market and is thus free to set a monopoly price. After a certain
while, a followers enters the market: he chooses a location and competes
in price with the leader. This is consistent with the view that the location
is a geographical parameter, or with the view that the design of a product
is generically far less flexible than its price. It seems to fit relatively well
products that have a long lifetime. Up to our knowledge, the only paper
that modifies the assumption of simultaneous pice competition is Anderson
(1987). He studies a price leadership configuration: the firms choose sequen-
tially the locations, then a Stackelberg competition in price takes place. The
subject of the paper is to determine which firm chooses to be the price leader;
the answer is that the second entrant prefers to be price leader, and the first
to be price follower. This is such the sequential setting that seems to be the
most likely to appear.
One has now to remark that all these standard settings assume that price
competition, whatever the form it takes, happens only after both location
are fixed. However, situations exist where protagonists in a market commit
to a price for a period as long as the product lifetime. Some firms, like
chainstores, publish a catalogue (a product-price couple) and stick to it for a
while. It could be, for example, that agency situations imply this inertia: an
employee that work as a seller is not allowed to lower the price of the product
it sells, he is forced to apply the announced price. Situations like these do not
fit the classical assumption that price competition occurs last, after everyone
has observed which products are in the market. It seems rather that some
firms commit to a price, while others react to these leader firms. This is
precisely the heart of the analysis we conduct here. In the present model,
we study the case where one firm enters first the market and, in addition to
the location of its product, commits to its price. Then a second firm chooses
its location and price, knowing the other’s catalogue. This is a Stackelberg
setting for the couple of variables (location, price).
The first consequence of this setting is a second mover advantage, because
only the second firm can use an undercutting strategy. The second is that an
equilibrium always exists. We qualify them depending on the willingness to
pay of the consumers for the family of products, as introduced by Lerner &
Singer (1937) and studied specifically in Economides (1984). The equilibrium
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is unique (up to the symmetry) as soon as this parameter is high enough so
that the market is entirely served. On the other hand, when the willingness
to pay is small, the firms can make two local monopolies, and many locations
are feasible, leading to multiplicity of equilibria. Moreover, we find that no
monotonicity appears in the shape of equilibria. For an intermediate range
of the parameter, the leader may price above or beyond the follower, and the
distance between locations varies from one half to one ninth. The diﬀerenti-
ation is thus intermediate. Finally for very high values of the parameter, the
strategies and payoﬀs do not depend on the parameter any more.
The first section of the paper introduces the model, the second solves the
case where the willingness to pay is unbounded (as in Hotelling’s original
model). In the third section, the equilibrium is qualified when the reserve
price is finite. The fourth section contains a discussion of the model about
sequentiality assumptions, and examples are given where the results seem to
have some predictive power. The last part concludes.
2 The model
We study a market where consumers belongs to a segment [0,1]. Consumers
are spread over the market according to a distribution function f (x). First
firm A chooses a location a on the interval and a price p, then firm B chooses
location b and price q after having observed A’s moves1. A consumer x
chooses to purchase a product according to its own utility maximization:
Max (v − d (x, a)− p, v − d (x, b)− q) . v is the reserve price, and a consumer
buys a product only if the perceived price is inferior to the reserve price. In
Hotelling’s original model, consumers always consume the good, they thus
minimize their disutility Min (d (x, a) + p, d (x, b) + q). This case is studied
in the next section and it corresponds to the case where v is infinite. With or
without a reservation price, consumer x prefers firm B whenever d (x, a)+p ≥
d (x, b) + q.
We will assume that when a consumer is indiﬀerrent between firm A and
B, it chooses the closest firm. If they have the same location or the distance
is equal, we will only assume that some consumers choose A while others
choose B. Moreover we will assume that a firm enters the market if and only
if it makes a strictly positive profit.
1For convenience, we choose a and b as the distance of firms to 0. Note that in Hotelling
1929 b is the distance of product B to 1.
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We look for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game depicted in
figure 1.
Firm A chooses:
Price p
Location a
Firm B chooses:
Price q
Location b
Consumption
(Market clears)
Figure 1: Game timing.
We may remark that if firm B chooses the same location as firm A, we
must have q ≤ p otherwise firm B gets no client. By setting a slightly
smaller price, firm B can get all the market. Thus if at equilibrium both
firms choose the same location, both firms price at zero. This would corre-
spond to a Bertrand competition, towards which Hotelling thought the firms
would move. However this undercutting strategy should not be played at
equilibrium. It is fundamental for the threat it represents, but if firms use it,
they get no profits which suggests that at equilibrium firms choose diﬀerent
locations. As pointed out by Anderson (1987, p. 379), Hotelling seems not
to have well taken these strategies into account, which lead him to a (par-
tially) wrong conclusion. In the present setting, as the first firm commits to
a price, it can not use an undercutting strategy. On the contrary, when firm
B enters the market, it has a powerful threat with the undercutting strategy.
As a result, we state the first proposition, which results does not depend on
the distribution nor on the reservation price. The proof is also valid for any
symmetric and single-peaked consumers’ utility function.
Proposition 1 If it exists a subgame perfect equilibrium, the follower makes
a (weakly) greater profit than the leader.
The proof is in the appendix.
We can derive from this first proposition that in our model the price
followership eﬀect is stronger than the location leadership eﬀect. This state-
ment is not general as Anderson (1987) in a diﬀerent framework showed that
a leader in location and price could earn slightly more than the follower in
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location and price if firms first commit to a location before choosing their
prices.
From now on we study the case where consumers are uniformly distributed
along the segment [0, 1].
The follower has two diﬀerent kind of strategies: either he decides to ex-
clude the first player, this will be called the takeover strategy, or he decides
to make a partial competition. The partial competition leaves firms with a
monopoly on some of its demand. We could have alternatively called the
takeover strategy the ’undercutting’ strategy, but this would rather corre-
spond to a setting where prices are chosen after both locations.
We will denote πi (a, p, b, q), for i = A,B the profit of player i when
strategies are a, p, b, q. Moreover we denote
³
bC , qC
´
=
³
bC (a, p) , qC (a, p)
´
the optimal strategy of firm B if he chooses to make a partial competition
and similarly
³
bT , qT
´
=
³
bT (a, p) , qT (a, p)
´
the best strategy of firm B such
that firm A is excluded.
Let’s note that
³
bT , qT
´
is a function of a, p which is not always well
defined. Indeed while choosing the optimal takeover strategy, firm B acts
such that consumers may be indiﬀerent between the good oﬀered by firm
A and B. Thus everything depends on the convention on how the market
is shared in this case. However this problem can be avoided because in the
path of the subgame perfect equilibrium firm A cannot play a strategy such
that this happens. We define ΠTB (a, p) = πB
³
a, p, bT , qT
´
and
³
bT , qT
´
such
that firm B takes all the clients that are indiﬀerent between firm A and B,
we might note that whatever the way market is shared firm B always gets
ΠTB (a, p) up to ² (by setting a price slightly under qT , firm B gets the whole
market). With this convention ΠTB (a, p) is a continuous function.³
bC , qC
´
is a well defined function of (a, p) but the profits are not con-
tinuous. The first discountinuities appear when firm B plays a strategy such
that the mass of indiﬀerent consumers is not null. However if we make the
classical assumption that indiﬀerent consumers choose the closest firm there
is only one discontinuity left, when
³
bC , qC
´
= (a, p). However as we already
stated, the first player cannot choose a situation where he would be excluded,
thus in the path of the subgame perfect equilbrium we can arbitrarly define
ΠCB (a, p) such that firm B takes only half of the remaining market when³
bC , qC
´
= (a, p). We may remark that in this case the threat of being ex-
cluded still exists with the takeover strategy. With this convention ΠCB (a, p)
is a continuous function.
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Without loss of generality we will assume that a ∈
h
0, 1
2
i
. We define
UA (x) = v−d (x, a)−p, moreover when there is no reserve price, we assume
that UA (x) > 0. The same notations are used for firm B.
Lemma 1 In any subgame perfect equilibrium, ΠCB∗ = ΠT∗B .
This lemma will be useful for the characterization of the equilibria.
2.1 Without reserve price
In this subsection we assume that consumers always consume the good what-
ever the price. This assumption is the one used by Hotelling (1929).
In this case the optimal strategy of firm B if it decides to make a takeover
on the leader’s market is such that
³
bT , qT
´
= (a, p) and thus by definition
ΠTB (a, p) = p.
Let us now compute firm B’s best reply if it decides to make a partial
competition. The optimal strategy is such that the consumer located at b
earns the same from both firms, i.e. q = p+(b− a). Indeed it is obvious that
if it is not the case then an optimal deviation of firm B would be (b− ², q)
with ² suﬃciently small (i.e. 0 < ² < b− a+ p− q), this deviation obviously
increases the size of firm B’s market while the price remains constant. Thus
firm B maximizes: ΠCB = (p+ b− a) . (1− b) s.t. 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1 and p > 0,
q > 0 (these constraints, that define the valid domain, will be implicit in
the following). The profit is a concave function, first order condition implies:³
bC , qC
´
=
³
1+a−p
2
, 1+p−a
2
´
. This solution is interior if and only if a+ p < 1.
Then ΠCB (a, p) =
(1+p−a)2
4
and ΠCA (a, p) = p.1+a−p2 . Moreover if a+p ≥ 1 the
second firm will prefer to take the whole market, thus the leader will choose
a < 1− p, or he gets zero profit. The program of firm A is then to maximize
ΠCA (a, p) under the constraints
a < 1− p (1)
and
ΠTB ≤ ΠCB (2)
(the solution is interior and the follower prefers not to take the whole market).
This last constraint yields a ≤ (1−√p)2 on the valid domain. As ΠCA (a, p)
is increasing in a, one of these constraints will be binding at equilibrium.
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But (1 − √p)2 < (1 − √p)(1 +√p) = 1 − p for all p > 0. Thus constraint
(2) is the binding one. Substituting in the objective function, A’s program
boils down to maximizing p.(1−√p) for p > 0. The value of the equilibrium
parameters are in turn fully determined by using binding constraint (2) and
the expression of the best-reply. This allows us to state:
Proposition 2 The subgame perfect equilibrium of the game is such that:
(a∗, p∗, b∗, q∗) =
µ
1
9
,
4
9
,
1
3
,
2
3
¶
Π∗A =
4
27
and Π∗B =
4
9
Perceived
price
0 1
9
4=p
3
2=q
9
1=a 31=b
9
4=Bπ274=Aπ
Figure 2: Equilibrium with infinite v.
The follower uses the umbrella price charged by firm A to fix its price,
thus the follower prices higher than the leader.
We may also notice that the distance between the firms is such that no
equilibrium with competitive price exists. It violates one of the existence con-
ditions given by d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979). Thus if ex post
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the leader was able to reset a new price after the entry of the follower then
he would have an incentive to undercut the follower’s price as in Hotelling
(1929). However as there is no equilibrium in location which leads firms with
positive profits if prices are chosen simultaneously, the leader wishes to irre-
versibly commit to a price in order to reach the equilibrium computed. The
locations and prices at equilibrium are depicted in figure 2.
2.2 Extension when consumers have a reservation price
We now assume that each consumer has a reserve price at v. We first compute
each best response of firm B according to the two strategies described above.
The two following lemmas are quite general for any v, however some cases
might not happen.
1st case 2nd case
4th case3rd case
0 1
p
v
b=a
x 0 1 x
p
v
b=a
0 1 x
p
v
a b 0 1 x
v
a
Figure 3: Takeover strategies.
Lemma 2 (Takeover strategy)
If p − a > v − 1 and p + a < 2 − v and p ≥ v+a
3
then
³
bT , qT
´
=³
3a+3p−v
4
, v+a+p
4
´
and ΠTB = 18 (v + a+ p)
2 .
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If p − a > v − 1 and 2 − v ≤ p + a then
³
bT , qT
´
=
³
1−v+a+p
2
, v−1+a+p
2
´
and ΠTB = v+a+p−12 .
If p− a > v− 1 and p+ a < 2− v and p ≤ v+a
3
then
³
bT , qT
´
= (a, p) and
ΠTB = p. (v + a− p)
If p− a ≤ v − 1 then
³
bT , qT
´
= (a, p) and gets the profit ΠTB = p.
In the first case, the follower takes more market than what was initially
served by the first firm, but the market is not entirely covered by firms. The
second case corresponds to a case where the firm B takes all the market
according to the strategy of the first firm. In the third case the follower
imitates exactly the strategy of the first firm. Finally in the last case the
firm A was initially covering the whole maket, the second firm can just do
as well as the leader. The diﬀerent cases are illustrated in figure 3.
1st case
0 1 x
p
v
2nd case
0 1 x
p
v
4th case3rd case
aa b
0 1 x
p
v
a b 0 1
x
p
v
a b
b
Figure 4: Partial competition strategies.
Lemma 3 (Partial competition strategy)
If p − a ≥ 2v − 1 then
³
bC , qC
´
=
³
3
2
v + a− p, v
2
´
and ΠCB = v
2
2
, ΠCA =
p. (v + a− p)
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If 5
3
v − 1 < p − a < 2v − 1 then
³
bC , qC
´
=
³
1+v+a−p
2
, 3v−1+a−p
2
´
and
ΠCB = 12 . (3v − 1 + a− p) . (1− v + p− a), ΠCA = p. (v + a− p)
If v − 1 < p − a < 5
3
v − 1 and p + 3a < 3 − v then
³
bC , qC
´
=³
5−3v+p−a
4
, 1+v+p−a
4
´
and ΠCB = 116 (1 + v + p− a)
2, ΠCA = p.3−v+a−p4 .
If p − a ≤ v − 1 and p + a ≤ 1 then
³
bC , qC
´
=
³
1−p+a
2
, 1+p−a
2
´
and
ΠCB = 14 . (1 + p− a)
2, ΠCA = p.1+a−p2 .
In the competition case, it is not useful to define the best response in all
points of the space as when this best reply is such that firm B enters at a
then we know that it cannot be the subgame perfect equilibrium.
The first case is such that the leader left enough room for the follower to
have a monopoly on its side. This case is the only one where the market is
not entirely covered. In the second case the follower only takes the remaining
market that the leader was not serving (this is the ’touching’ equilibrium in
Economides (1984)). In the third case, there is a real competition between
firms and the utility of the indiﬀerent consumer is stricly positive. In the last
case the leader could alone serve the whole the market, and the competition
is such that the follower chooses a diﬀerent location but adjusts its price on
the leader’s one. The diﬀerent cases are illustrated in figure 4.
Proposition 3 For 0 ≤ v ≤ 1
2
both firms have a monopoly on their sides
thus Π∗A = Π∗B = v
2
2
.
For 1
2
≤ v ≤ 3
2
many configurations arise, as it is depicted on figures 5
and 6.
For v ≥ 3
2
the subgame perfect equilibrium does not depend on v any more,
and firms have constant profits regarding v: (a∗, p∗, b∗, q∗) =
³
1
9
, 4
9
, 1
3
, 2
3
´
and
Π∗A = 427 and Π∗B =
4
9
.
We did not derive the explicit optimal strategy for firm A, as cases are
too numerous especially for 1
2
≤ v ≤ 1. We numerically calculate them on
the basis of the best replies computed in lemmas 2 and 3. It is however
straightforward to show that for v ≥ 2 the optimal strategy is the same
as the one defined in the case where consumers have no reservation price,
because the only possible case of partial competition strategy is the fourth
one2 and thus we always have UA (1) > 0. Further computation shows that
2Indeed the first case is only possible when v ≤ 1, the second one when v ≤ 32 and the
third one when v ≤ 2.
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this still holds when v ≥ 3
2
. Indeed only the third and the fourth cases
are then possible as best reply for firm B. The third case implies that the
takeover strategy is the first one, thus the optimum for firm A can formally
be computed. It is worse than if firm A chooses its optimal strategy with
UA (1) > 0.
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1 1,2 1,4 1,6 1,8 2
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
p
q
a
b
v
v0 v1 v2 v3
Figure 5: Equilibrium strategies as functions of v.
We may notice from figure 5 that there is a discountinuity for v close to
3
2
. This is due to the fact that while v is inferior to 2 there might be two
local maxima for the profit of the first player (there are two when v ≤ 1.6).
The global maximum then switches from one to the other at v = 3
2
.
From figure 5 we can state that the leader chooses a more and more
specific product while v increases. Indeed for given prices, firms can serve
a bigger market and competition becomes then tougher. Thus firm A tries
to specialize in order to avoid an undercutting strategy of firm B. While
the market is well segmented when v is smaller than v0 = 12 , the distance
between the products of firm A and B decrease continuously with v (excepted
for v = 3
2
). This observation is in fact in line with the principle of minimum
diﬀerentiation: when v increases, the relative weight of the transport cost
regarding the reserve price decreases thus products become more similar from
12
00,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
0 0,5 1 1,5 2 v
πB*
πA*
v0 v1 v2 v3
πM
Figure 6: Equilibrium payoﬀs as functions of v.
the consumer’s point of view and then firms apparently prefers to make
closest products. The level of prices are almost increasing for both firms
when v increase but it drastically decrease for v = 3
2
. Moreover price of firm
A can be higher or lower than the one of firm B. Indeed firms have two levers
regarding competition: price and location, and depending on the areas firms
use either one or the other in order to capture more consumers.
Figure 5 also helps understanding how strategies change with v. When v
is lower than v1, the market is perfectly shared between firms: the indiﬀerent
consumer gets no surplus and he is located at x = 1
2
. However, the price of
firm A is lower than the one of firm B in order to avoid a takeover strategy
which allows firm B to almost get the monopoly profits. When v1 < v < v2
firm A still plays a strategy such that the firm B is not going to go for
competition against the leader. The product chosen by firm A is more and
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more specific but the price set by firm A increases and can become higher
than the one of firm B. Indeed the opportunity of takeover strategies for firm
B forces firm A to choose a specific product. When v2 < v < v3 the leader
cannot avoid the competition with firm B, the indiﬀerent consumer then gets
a positive utility. The ’partial competition’ strategy of firm B is then the
third one. We can see from figure 5 that firm A then decrease its price slowly
in order to be more competitive but keeps almost the same product. On the
other hand, firm B prefers to choose a closer product to the one of firm A
while increasing its price. For v > v3 the strategy of firm A suddenly changes,
firm A decreases hugely its price and chooses a product a little more generic,
this is in fact its only way to avoid a takeover strategy of firm B. In this
case the competition is tough as strategies and profits of both firms remain
constant despite an increase in the reserve price of the consumers. This is
the reason why B’s profit is discontinuous at v = 3
2
. The strategy of firm A
changes and in turn changes the form of all types of best reply, in particular
the competition one, which is used in equilibrium, as well as the take over
one.
0.3330.4440.1480.6660.3330.4440.1111.5
0.2410.5760.2030.7590.5090.8450.0581.25
0.3330.4440.2590.6670.6670.7760.1091
0.5000.2500.2290.5000.4580.7500.2070.75
0.5000.1250.1250.2500.2500.2500.2500.5
A’s 
MS*
πBπ Aqpbav
* MS: market shares
Figure 7: Numerical examples
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3 Discussion
3.1 Price commitment
In the litterature on horizontal diﬀerentiation, many diﬀerent sequential set-
tings have been studied. Hotelling (1929) who of course was not aware
of Nash’s work, studied a simultaneous price game given locations. As
d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) showed, there does not exist
a Nash equilibrium when locations are too close. It turns out that there is
a problem if firms can choose their locations first, because for any given lo-
cation of firm A, firm B has an incentive to get the closest it can. Following
Hotelling’s reasoning, profits should in turn decrease to zero because of price
war. Thus, whatever the setting (either sequential or simultaneous) of prod-
uct choice, if prices are chosen simultaneously there is no subgame perfect
equilibrium with linear transportation costs. In our model, we showed that
a price commitment of one firm before the entry of the second firm restores
the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium. In a way there is some value
to commit in a price for the first firm, because for some location and price,
it discourages the other to make use of undercuting. However, in a sense,
this price commitment is not credible as firm A has an incentive to change
its price after firm B’s moves. This is actually a standard problem with se-
quential price competition. This commitment has to be irreversible to be
credible.
Another feature of the model that calls for a careful interpretation con-
cerns relative flexibility of location and price. While in the geographical
interpretation of the model the location choice is a long-term decision rel-
atively to the price decision, one can think of markets where both variable
are equally flexible. The catering industry seems to provide a good example
of this. The product lifetime is very short, and the choice of the product
can be a daily decision for independent restaurants, making product choice
and price choice equally flexible. In contrast, for chains, uniform pricing
and centralized decisions exhibits more inertia. In other words, chains make
their price public by advertisement and national catalogues, while indepen-
dent stores react to these leaders. The converse is obviously not true: local
competition by a small competitor do not lead chains to revise their cata-
logue. Going deeper into this example, one can remark that the model also
fits the observation that chain restaurants sell more specialized products (like
pizzas or Tex-mex food), with relatively lower prices than small competitors.
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This conclusion reached for v high enough corresponds to the consumers’
behaviour when they leave oﬃce at noon to eat.
3.2 Sequential setting
When one introduces sequentiality in diﬀerentiation models, six possible se-
quential settings are to be considered. We already know that the (two) cases
where firms choose prices simultaneously have no equilibrium. Up to our
knowledge, Anderson (1987) is the closest paper about sequential prices and
diﬀerentiation. He studies the two cases (2 and 3 in figure 8) where firms first
sequentially choose their location and then sequentially choose their prices.
He proves then that the most likely equilibrium to appear is the one with the
location leader being subsequently the price follower (case 3). The explana-
a b p q
a b,q p
Market
clears
Market
clears
a,p b,q Market
clears
a b p,q Market
clears
(1) 
Hotelling 
(1929)
(2)
Anderson I 
(1987)
(3)
Anderson II 
(1987)
(4)
This model
A A,BB
A B A B
A B A
A B
Figure 8: Timing comparison.
tion is that the location leader can choose a product such that the location
follower prefers to be the price leader: the location leader then locates at the
center of the market. The follower’s profit in this case is 0.428.
A discussion arises about the credibility of the equilibrium he favours,
using our timing structure. If the location follower decides to wait for the
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location leader to post its price before choosing its product (which is our
timing structure), it makes a greater profit 0.444. Thus if ex ante of the
game the follower can credibly commit to make an attrition game until the
leader posts a price then the most credible timing sequence of a game where
each firm can choose its location and decide to post prices whenever it wants
is that there will be a location leader, which will at the same time post its
price and be a leader on price before the follower chose its location and price.
However this commitment is not credible per se in our timing sequence: if
the leader choose its optimal strategy as in Anderson’s model (a = 0.5) then
the follower has a huge incentive to choose its product before the leader posts
its price. Indeed if the leader posts its price before the entry of the second
firm he has to fix a really small price in order to prevent an undercutting
strategy of the follower and thus he spoils the market for both firms.
Thus we can distinguish two cases. If the choice of product can become
irreversible whithout fixing a price then Anderson’s model is more credible:
the leader chooses a generic product (a = .5) then the follower choose a
specific product (b = 0.869) and its price while the leader is the Bertrand
follower; prices are relatively high (pA = 1.277, pB = 1.185) as well as profits
(ΠA = 0.815,ΠB = 0.428). We can note that in this case the leader is
better oﬀ than the follower. On the contrary if the commitment of firms can
only be a product-price couple thus if firm A cannot commit to a product
without giving its price or if firm B can credibly commit to enter the market
only after firm A chose its price, then our model is the most credible . The
second firm has a second mover advantage. The leader chooses a specific
product (a=1/9) with a low price (pA = 0.444) in order to secure its market
while the follower thrives under the umbrella price of the leader by choosing
a more generic product (b = .333,pB = 0.667). The profits are then low
(ΠA = 0.148,ΠB = 0.444). We can note that this catalogue competition is
fiercer than the Anderson’s one. Moreover there is a value to commit to a
product independently of a price only for the leader.
Our model is thus more consistent with markets where information that
is usually available consists of catalogue, a product-price couple. The con-
clusion from this comparison is that a ’catalogue competition’ is at least
as credible as Anderson’s alternate leadership equilibrium on markets where
product choice is flexible.
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4 Conclusion
Since Hotelling’s 1929 work, many economists have investigated the so called
principle of minimum diﬀerentiation. Whereas d’Aspremont Gabszewicz and
Thisse (1979) show that there is in fact no equilibrium when prices are chosen
simultaneously, we show that a sequential timing in both locations and prices
is suﬃcient to restore the existence of an equilibrium. The equilibrium is such
that: 1) the follower earns always more than the leader and this result holds
whatever the distribution of consumers along the space and the (symmetric)
costs structure; 2) when consumers are uniformly distributed, the leader
makes the follower indiﬀerent between excluding him from the market and
choosing a location such that each firm has a fraction of the market. When
the willingness to pay of the consumers is small, competition is soft between
firms and it becomes tougher when the reserve price increases. Actually
when consumers are not too picky on the product (v ≥ 3
2
), the strategies of
firms become constant regarding v, the competition is then fierce and firms
choose close locations. As Economides (1984), we find that the value of the
reservation price changes the structure of equilibrium, especially regarding
the location of the products. The diﬀerentiation is indeed never minimal at
equilibrium, and is even very high for low reservation values. One actually
does not need to take quadratic distance costs à la d’Aspremont & al (1979)
to obtain diﬀerentiated products in equilibrium.
The second mover advantage present in this model calls for a compari-
son with Anderson’s (1987) model. While he privileged the case where the
location follower is (endogenously) price leader, we show here that ex ante
the follower will prefer to wait until the location leader announces its price
before entering the market. However ex post of a leader’s decision of location
the follower will agree on being a price leader. Thus we might have opposite
conclusion depending on the credibility of firms commitment in price as well
as in location. In addition, when there is a sunk cost to bear to enter the
market, there is a threshold entry cost such that the leader will deter entry.
This type of model can be interpreted as a model of competition through
catalogue. There exist many markets where consumers get information only
through advertisement and catalogue, and as such activities are costly, firms
do not go continuously into them. In these situations, price commitment
and price inertia are equivalent in terms of consequences on the market.
The dynamic of prices should also be analyzed in terms of sequentiality of
announces and heterogeneous reactive abilities in horizontal diﬀerentiation
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models. It seems that the conclusions of the present model are consistent
with the fact that big firms (firm A) still publish catalogues, even if they
anticipate that smaller, more reactive firms will compete with them and
earn bigger margin. The first entrant’s catalog exhibits relatively low prices
and specialized products, as can be seen from restaurants chains. The first
catalog serves as reference for the followers, for prices as well as for the type of
products. The credibility of such price-location commitment stems from the
fact that in absence of commitment, profits are driven to zero by Hotelling’s
like location dynamics in which firms tend to get very close in locations.
5 Appendix
5.1 Entry barriers
In this paragraph, we investigate the role of entry barriers in the model. First,
if we assume that each firm has the same entry cost, the first proposition
implies that there are no entry deterring strategies played in equilibrium in
the game with n possible entrants. Indeed, as a follower can always make as
well as the last firm who entered the market, if the last firm was covering its
entry cost, the follower is also able to do it. Thus as the leader can always
earn a stricly positive profit, if the entry cost tends to zero, there is no upper
bound on the number of firms to enter: the economy is fragmented and not
segmented. This result is in line with the one of Shaked and Sutton (1987)
on horizontal diﬀerentiation even though here firms choose sequentially both
prices and locations.
If we now assume that the follower has to bear an entry cost f while
the leader is an incumbent who has no set up cost, then there might exist
strategies deterring the entry of a new firm. Its obvious strategy is to set a
price p = f and to choose the midpoint location a = 1
2
. The takeover strategy
of the follower allows him to have a profit just less than f , and it is clearly its
optimal strategy as a follower (competition strategies of the follower yields
ΠC2 = 1+2f4 .
3−2f
4
< f , because the solution is interior only if f < 1
2
). This
strategy of firm A is optimal if f > 4
27
, as it allows the leader to get profit
f , while when f ≤ 4
27
the leader has no interest in deterring entry of firm
B. There is thus a threshold value of f over which firm A prefers to remain
alone on the market, and is able to do so.
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5.2 Proof of proposition 1:
Proof.
We prove that we cannot have ΠB < ΠA.
We assume that firm A chose a∗, p∗ and firm B chose b∗, q∗ we can prove
that firm B has a better reply at a∗, p∗ − ².
Let ∆ = ΠA −ΠB > 0.
It is obvious that if firm B leaves b then the support of captive consumers
of firm A is larger. By pricing at p∗− ² more consumers will buy the product
of firm B than what they would do if only firm A was there˙.
Thus the support S00 = {x|v − d (x, a∗)− p∗ + ² ≥ 0} is larger than S0 =
{x|v − d (x, a∗)− p∗ ≥ 0}.
Moreover S0 is larger than S = {x|v − d (x, a∗)− p∗ ≥ 0 and d (x, a∗) + p∗ ≥ d (x, b∗) + q∗} .
Let µ =
R
S f (x) .dx
Thus the profit of firm B is: ΠB (a∗, p∗ − ²) = (p∗ − ².) .
R
S
00 f (x) .dx ≥
(p∗ − ².) .
R
S f (x) .dx ≥ Π1 − ².µ
Thus if 0 < ² < ∆
µ
then−².µ > ΠB−ΠA thus we proved thatΠB (a∗, p∗ − ²) >
ΠB (b∗, q∗) and the deviation is profitable. By contradiction we can conclude
that ΠB ≥ ΠA.
5.3 Proof of lemma 1:
Lemma 4 1 If we assume that indiﬀerent consumers always choose the near-
est firm and whatever the convention on how the market is shared (when
both firms have the same location)3 then when the set such that ΠCB (a∗, p∗) =
ΠTB (a∗, p∗) is non empty, there is a subgame perfect equilibrium and firm A’s
optimal strategy is (a∗, p∗).
Proof. Clearly, if an equilibrium exists, firm A makes a positive profit; thus
it must be the case that firm B prefers not to exclude firm A: ΠCB (a∗, p∗) ≥
ΠTB (a∗, p∗).
3In fact we only need to assume that either the leader keeps some consumers when
both firms have the same location and price, or that the second firm prefers a partial
competition when it is indiﬀerent between making a takeover or a partial competition.
Otherwise there is still a discountinuity problem and there might be no subgame perfect
equilibrium.
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Let us assume that ΠTB (a∗, p∗) < ΠCB (a∗, p∗): we will show that it is
impossible in equilibium. First, in this case, the optimal response of firm B
is necessarily such that b∗ > a∗. We separate in three cases:
· If UA(0) < 0, firm A would have a better response, shifting position to
the left while keeping the same price. This softens competition for firm A,
without increasing the takeover desirability for firm B, thus enlarges (at least
weakly) the support of consumers of firm A.
· If UA (0) > 0, we show that firmA has a profitable deviation: (a∗ + ², p∗ + ²),
for ² small enough. The optimal competition response of firm B does not
change, as UA remains the same on [a∗ + ², 1]. However ΠTB (a∗ + ², p∗ + ²) >
ΠTB (a∗, p∗): the desirability of takeover has increased. But as ΠTB is continu-
ous with respect to a and p, there exists ² small enough so thatΠTB (a∗ + ², p∗ + ²) <
ΠCB (a∗, p∗), UA(0) is still positive and a∗+ ² < b∗. Firm B’s optimal reaction
is unchanged, the support of clients of firm A is the same and the price is
higher, thus ΠA increases.
· If UA (0) = 0 (v − p∗ − a∗ = 0), first note that p∗ < v2 as otherwise
ΠTB (a∗, p∗) = ΠM ≥ ΠCB (a∗, p∗). Moreover the support S∗ served by firm A is
stricly superior than a∗ = v−p∗ > v
2
> p∗. We have thusΠA (a∗ + ², p∗ + ²) =
(p∗ + ²) . (S∗ − ²) = Π∗A+ ². (S∗ − p∗ − ²) thus as S∗− p∗ > 0 we can take an
0 < ² < S∗ − p∗ such that this deviation increases ΠA.
Finally, by contradiction we can conclude that we must have ΠTB = ΠCB
in any subgame perfect equilibrium.
On this set the second player always chooses a partial competition and³
bC , qC
´
6= (a, p), thus ΠCA (a∗, p∗) is continuous. Moreover as both functions
are continuous on this particular set, this set is closed. Thus as the first
player maximizes a continuous function on a compact, there is at least one
solution when this compact is non empty. Moreover every solution gives the
same profit to the first player.
In the following, we will make extensive use of the notations:
xi: the greatest point at which utility of consumer buying product i is weakly
positive.
xi is defined similarly.
y is the indiﬀerent consumer whenever it exists and is unique.
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5.4 Proof of lemma 2:
Proof.
For this set of strategy, firm B wants to price as high as possible, under
the constraint that it excludes firm A from the market. It is expressed, for
instance, by UA(a) ≤ UB(a)⇔ v − p ≤ v − b+ a− q. And as firm B wants
to maximize the price it sets, this constraint will be binding. We thus look
for strategies having the property b = p+ a− q.
1. Let’s first assume that
v − 1 < p− a (S1)
In this case, firm B does not necessarily serve consumers at 1. The
profit is: ΠB = q.Min (1, xB) = q.Min (1, v + a+ p− 2q).
If an interior solution exists, it solves Max [q. (v + a+ p− 2q)] which
solution is q = v+a+p
4
, b = 3a+3p−v
4
when interior and gives profit ΠB =
1
8
(v + a+ p)2.
This solution is valid if a ≤ b, so if a ≤ 3a+3p−v
4
⇔
3p− a ≥ v (T1)
and if xB ≤ 1, or
p+ a ≤ 2− v (T2)
2. If p+a > 2−v, Firm B serves the whole market, being only constrained
to let some positive utility to consumers at 0.The optimal strategy is
q = p+a+v−1
2
and b = p+a+1−v
2
it gives a profit of Π2 = p+a+v−12 .
3. If p < v+a
3
, the solution is not interior because firm B’s unconstrained
optimum does not permit to take A’s market. So firm B chooses price
p and location a. The profit is ΠB = p. (v + a− p).
4. We now assume that UA (1) ≥ 0:
p− a ≤ v − 1 (S1)
then the least costly strategy to exclude A is obviously
³
bT , qT
´
= (a, p),
yielding profit ΠTB = p.
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5.5 Proof of lemma 3:
Proof.
1. If firm A’s strategy verifies 1− xA ≥ v ⇔
2v − 1 ≤ p− a (S2)
firm B can act as a (local) monopolist. There might be a multiplicity
of optimal strategies for firm B if it has more room than necessary for
a monopoly. The profit is ΠB = v
2
2
with price q = v
2
and any location
satisfying xA ≤ xB ≤ 1 or 32v + a− p ≤ b ≤ 1−
v
2
.
Assume now
v − 1 ≤ p− a < 2v − 1 (S1 & S2)
which says two things: there is no room for B to make a monopoly and
UA (1) ≤ 0. First we can state that as firm A does not serve consumers
at point 1, if firm B serves them, their utility level is zero. Moreover,
it is always advantageous to take the consumers on the free side of the
market for firm B, rather than not serving them. Thus in equilibrium
we could have only UB (1) = 0, or b = 1− v + q.
2. The first possible strategy for firm B is to serve only the remaining
market. The best of these strategies is to locate in the middle of the
free market: b = xA+ 1−xA2 =
1+v+a−p
2
, and to set the minimal price to
cover the free market: a price such that UB(xA) = 0 ⇔ q = 3v−1+a−p2 .
This yields the profit ΠB = 12 (3v − 1− p+ a) (1− v + p− a).
3. The second possible strategy is to compete for a part of A’s market in
addition to take the free market. The profit of firm B is in this case
ΠB = q. (1− y). We maximize this profit along b = 1−v+q. Substitut-
ing y = 1
2
(a+b−p+q) and b, it becomesΠB = q2 (1 + v − 2q + p− a). It
is concave in q and the first order condition implies: −4q+1+v−a+p =
0⇔ q = 1+v+p−a
4
< v and b = 5−3v+p−a
4
< 1. The profit of this strategy
is ΠB = 116 (1 + v + p− a)
2. However, for the solution to be valid, it
should not correspond to a takeover case: we must have UA(a) > UB(a).
This yields the constraint
p+ 3a < 3− v (C1)
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And in addition, this solution is only defined if UB (y) ≥ 0⇔ 2v+ a−
b − q − p ≥ 0. Substituting q and b, it yields: 2v + a − 5−3v−a+p
4
−
1+v−a+p
4
− p ≥ 0⇔
p− a ≤ 5
3
v − 1 (C2)
To summarize, if 5
3
v − 1 ≤ p− a ≤ 2v − 1, the first type of strategy is
preferred by firm B.
If v− 1 ≤ p− a < 5
3
v− 1 and p+3a < 3− v, firm B prefers the second
type of strategy, and finally if the last constraint is not satisfied, firm
B prefers to take the whole market.
4. Assume finally that
p− a < v − 1 (S1)
which means UA (1) > 0. Firm B will capture consumers at 1. The best
reply will be such that UA (b) = UB (b), as we have seen in the first part.
Thus we have b = a + q − p and ΠB = q. (1− b) = q. (1− a− q + p) .
The profit is concave in q, and has an interior maximum if (first-order
condition): 2.q = 1− a+ p⇔ q = 1+p−a
2
. For this solution to be valid,
we must have 0 < q < v ⇔ −1 < p− a < 2v − 1. But by assumption,
p−a < v−1 < 2v−1. Moreover b = 1−p+a
2
and we must have: a < b⇔
p+ a < 1 (C3)
One can easily check that b < 1. Finally, the solution is interior if
p+ a < 1, and firm B gets ΠB = 14 . (1 + p− a)
2. When p+ a ≥ 1, firm
B always prefers to make a takeover on the leader’s market (qT = p,
bT = a).
Finally the choices of strategy when firm B had diﬀerent best response
(i.e. in the first case) allow us to state that the profit of the firm A is always
ΠA = p.y where y = a+b−p+q2 .
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